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Economics has been a most puzzling science, namely since the neoclassical revolution defined the 
legitimate procedures for theorisation and quantification. Its epistemology has based on farce: 
decisive tests are not applied on dare predictions. As a consequence, estimation has finally been 
replaced by simulation, and empirical tests have been substituted by non-disciplined exercises of 
comparison of models with reality. Furthermore, the core concepts of economics defy the normally 
accepted semantics and tend to establish meanings of their own. One of the obvious instances is the 
notion of rationality, which has been generally equated with the apt use of formal logic or the ability 
to apply econometric estimation as a rule of thumb for daily life. In that sense, rationality is defined 
devoid of content, as alien to the construction of significance and reference by reason and social 
communication. 
 
The contradictory use of simulacra and automata, by John von Neumann and Herbert Simon, was a 
response to this escape of economic models from reality, suggesting that markets could be 
conceived of as complex institutions. But most mainstream economists did not understand or did not 
accept these novelties, and the empirical inquiry or the realistic representation of the action of 
agents and of their social interaction remained a minor domain of economics, and was essentially 
ignored by canonical theorizing. 
 
The argument of the current paper is based on a survey and discussion of the twin contributions of 
experimental and computational economics to these issues. Although mainly arising out of the 
mainstream, these emergent fields of economics generate challenging heuristics as well as new 
empirical results that defy orthodoxy.  
 
Their contributions both to the definition of the social meanings of rationality and to the definition 
of a new brand of inductive economics are discussed. 
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1. Introduction and some methodological digressions 
 
Contributions in experimental economics nowadays include all domains of economics, from 
individual decision making to industrial organization, game theory, finance and macroeconomics. 
Clearly, any attempt at reviewing such immense body of literature in the following few pages would 
be beside the point (a must-read for an extensive review of the discipline categorized by subfields is 
Roth and Kagel (1995)); rather, in the following section we will try to briefly highlight few of the 
main problems raised by contemporary investigation in experimental economics, focussing 
especially on studies of individual decision making and rationality on one hand, and on strategic 
interaction on the other hand. 
 
The first experiments in economics, some of which date back to the works of Thurstone (see Roth, 
1995) were concerned, as appears intuitive, with testing ordinal utility theory in simple individual 
decision making tasks. Later on, the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour by 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern gave rise to a great amount of experimental work on strategic 
interaction. The first, famous attempts to verify the empirical soundness of expected utility date 
back to the famous informal experiments by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). The field of 
individual decision making has borrowed more than any other from cognitive psychology, and the 
extensive and fruitful dialogue between theory and experimentation has given birth to the field of  
`behavioural economics', which fosters the introduction of psychological principles into economic 
theory (see, e.g., Loewenstein, 1999). 
 
Game theory too contributed enormously to sky-rocketing economists' interest toward experiments, 
since it lent itself very naturally to being tested in the lab, as testified also by the fact that some 
prominent game theorists, such as John Nash, Thomas Schelling and Reinhardt Selten have been 
(and the last one still is) active experimentalists. Relatedly, the famous experiments by Chamberlin 
(1948) and afterward Smith (1962) generated an equally influential stream of experimental research 
on the functioning of diverse market institutions.  
 
Nowadays, experimental economics seems to have been finally acknowledged as a fully legitimate 
branch of `mainstream' economic science; the assignment in 2002 of the Nobel Memorial Prize to 
Vernon Smith, who is unanimously considered, together with Charles Plott, the pioneer of the 
discipline (though certainly not the first economic experimentalist) appeared to many as the long-
anticipated official acceptance of laboratory experiments within the realm of `respectable' methods 
of inquiry in the economics profession. It seemed all the more surprising to many, since the 
impossibility to test economic theories by means of experiments had for a long time been one of the 
most widely accepted articles of faith among economists. 
 
Smith (2002) himself reports the Cambridge economist Joan Robinson affirming that “economists 
cannot make use of controlled experiments to settle their differences” (quoted in Smith, 2002: 114). 
She was only one among many to have made such (or a similar) statement. They were of course all 
wrong in a literary sense; it must be said that Robinson referred precisely to experiments in the 
macro sense and, in spite of favouring some sort of social engineering, she refused to accept that 
economists could simply test their models and check the results in real economies, since social life 
is not a laboratory. Nevertheless, there is something peculiar about experiments in economics which 
renders them very different, in some fundamental way, from experiments in the natural sciences like 
physics, biology or chemistry and which prevents many from considering economics an empirical 
science. Such peculiarity lies, in our view, in the perceived larger gap - as compared to the 
commonly held perception regarding the realm of the natural sciences - that would exist between 
phenomena that emerge in the laboratory and what happens in the `real world'. A widely diffused   3
attitude among economists confronted with experimental results that apparently refute some 
theoretical predictions is that of dismissing the evidence on the - admittedly, rather unconvincing - 
grounds that individuals operating in the real world and subject to market forces `would get it right'.  
This objection may at times get instantiated in the form of a critique to the relevance for real world 
economic decisions of the small financial stakes typically involved in laboratory experiments. As 
Colin Camerer nicely puts it when speaking about the emergence of other-regarding behaviour in 
experimental bargaining games ``If I had a dollar for every time an economist claimed that raising 
the stakes would drive ultimatum behaviour toward self-interest, I'd have a private jet on standby all 
day'' (Camerer, 2003: 60). 
 
Such criticism to the `falsificational’ role of experiments is not at all unique to economics; on the 
contrary, it pervades all experimental sciences and can be subsumed under the well-known Duhem-
Quine (D-Q) problem, which states that any experiment jointly tests the specific theory that 
motivated the experiment in the first place, and the set of auxiliary hypotheses that were required in 
order to implement the experiment (see, e.g., Smith, 2002). Among the latter are, in the case of 
economic experiments, the hypotheses that financial rewards were adequate, that subjects were 
sufficiently motivated, that instructions were clear, that all potentially interfering noisy variables 
had been controlled for, and so on (see Smith, 2002). Consequently, if the results of the experiment 
contradict the prediction of the theory, it can be equally safely concluded that the theory was 
falsified or that one or more of the auxiliary hypotheses were falsified.  
 
And yet, economists seem particularly reluctant to take experimental results seriously, and many of 
them persistently prefer the second of the two possible explanations of the evidence, quite often 
with a dismissive attitude toward those scholars – mainly psychologists – who dare to question 
expected utility theory and related dogmas. Binmore states: “Just as we need to use clean test tubes 
in chemistry experiments, so we need to get the laboratory conditions right when testing economic 
theory’’ (Binmore, 1999, p. F17).  While it’s hard to deny the need to perform chemistry 
experiments using clean tubes, it’s not at all clear when exactly the conditions for economic 
experiments can be considered to be right. Binmore (1999) seems to provide an answer by stating 
that economic theory can be subject to laboratory testing only when the task at hand is reasonably 
simple and it is perceived as such by the experimental subjects, when financial stakes are 
`adequate’, and when the time allowed for trial-and-error learning is `sufficient’.  But the fact that 
`adequate’ and `sufficient’ are put between quotation marks by the author should immediately point 
at the inherent arbitrariness of such definition. When are financial incentives considered adequate 
and time for learning sufficient? No matter how high the stakes (conditional on the relatively limited 
financial possibilities of the majority of experimental labs) and how many repetitions of a single 
trial subjects perform, there simply is no way to establish when these conditions are met in any 
particular experiment. 
 
This impediment emerges out of three types of difficulties. First, it seems reasonable to require that 
time for learning should be longer the more complicated the task; hence, it sounds implausible to 
establish a rule that does not take differences between experiments into account.  Second, there are 
many more arguments that defenders of economic orthodoxy can (and do) use to continuously 
downturn the relevance of experimental results, including the defence of existing theories on the 
grounds that these are `useful approximations’ not intended to describe individual behaviour 
precisely.  But when is a given approximation not good enough any more (especially if there is a 
better approximation available?)  And, finally, no matter how much time for learning you give your 
subjects, there will always be someone objecting that the feedback environment of the laboratory is 
certainly sparse compared to the real environment in which economic agents operate and learn 
(Binmore, 1999). Unfortunately, there is no easy way to establish whether such statements are right 
or wrong. It could as well be argued, for example, that the environment in which real economic   4
agents learn and interact, exactly because is immensely richer than the artificial environment of the 
lab, is also much more complex and difficult to understand for boundedly rational individuals.  
 
When problems are ill-defined, as most real life problems are, and the number of relevant variables 
is much higher than our minds are able to grasp, learning is more difficult because feedback can be 
very ambiguous, and the process of causal attribution necessary for most learning processes to occur 
can be impeded by the opacity of the relations between actions and consequences which instead are 
made transparent to subjects in the typical laboratory experiment. 
  
Having said that, we think experimental economics so far has only benefited from such intense 
criticism, and it will continue to benefit even more in the future. Partly in response to the objections 
above outlined, new experiments have been conducted, experimental techniques have refined a great 
deal, new, more radical departures from experimental `orthodoxy', like brain imaging experiments 
and anthropological studies on small-scale societies around the world, are becoming increasingly 
popular, and truly unexpected phenomena have been discovered, which in turn have stimulated both 
theorizing and further experimentation. At the same time, the accumulation of evidence has made it 
increasingly difficult to defend existing theories where these do not work, and has strengthened the 
belief in the accuracy of theories that do seem to work in the lab.  
 
More radically, we think that the insistence on a theory-testing view of experiments is highly 
misleading and does not make justice of the importance of experimentation in economics. Maybe 
too much ink has been wasted debating on whether obscure and highly formal theories that belong 
to mathematics more than economics could be said to have been falsified or not by experimental 
results, while we believe that a much more inductive approach should inspire both economists who 
run experiments and economists who build new theories to interpret their results (the two of course 
sometimes coincide!). Experiments can be wonderful tools to inductively explore human behaviour 
in economic contexts and to discover new, interesting behavioural regularities. This applies to 
individual decision-making and even more so to situations of collective interaction like games and 
markets. For example, the mere discovery that individuals are not Bayesian sounds much less 
interesting in itself than the unpacking of the specific heuristics (like, e.g., representativeness, 
availability and the like) that people use when forming probabilistic judgments
1.  
 
Another good example is the behaviour of experimental subjects in coordination games, where 
theory is simply silent due to the impossibility of discriminating among multiple equilibria. In such 
cases, experiments have been useful to explore the context-inspired coordination patterns among 
groups of individuals. Experiments on coordination games have produced other surprising results, 
such as the emergence of almost perfect coordination observed in market entry-games arising out of 
simple behavioural heuristics combined with heterogeneity.  
 
This is acknowledged, not surprisingly, by some of the most heterodox of the orthodox, such as 
William Brock (2002), who states:  
“Some versions of standard economics do not much look for patterns. Instead, they are a type of 
deductive study that is often highly formal involving proofs and lemmas. That is not the approach to 
science that most scientists take; this type of standard economics approach belongs to mathematical 
philosophy more than it does to science. It may be important, but it is not science. As some famous 
sage stated: `To do science is to find patterns and explain them’ ”(Brock, 2002: 31, emphasis 
added).  
                                                 
1 By the way, this was the initial spirit with which Kahneman and Tversky initiated their famous ‘Heuristics-and-Biases’ research program, which has been 
subsequently highly criticized on the grounds that it would depict humans as dumb ill-informed decision makers who fall victims of all sorts of cognitive 
illusions and framing effects. In reality, Kahneman and Tversky explicitly referred to an analogy with studies on perception, where cognitive illusions are of 
scientific interest only insofar as they can provide clues to understand the functioning of human vision and are not relevant in themselves.    5
Indeed, this statement echoes previous considerations on the exhaustion of economics as an elegant 
corpus of deductive theories, with a rigorous aesthetic discipline imposed by some bourbakist chien-
de-garde. Frank Hahn, who endeavoured the representation of general equilibrium with Kenneth 
Arrow, recognised with sorry that “the task we set ourselves after the last war, to deduce all that was 
required from a number of axioms, has almost been completed, and while not worthless has only 
made a small contribution to our understanding” (Hahn, 1994: 258). 
 
In our view, experiments can represent an extremely useful alternative tool to find patterns and try 
to explain them. Together with agent-based simulations, they can foster a much more inductive, 
bottom up approach to economics which can bring the discipline much closer to being a science 
than it has ever been in the last century or so. In particular, once the notion of bounded rationality, 
for a long time advanced by Herb Simon as a useful concept to inspire empirically-driven models of 
human behaviour and invariably neglected by most mainstream economists, is taken seriously, 
experiments appear as the ideal methodological tools (though not the only ones) to give bounded 
rationality a more concrete and operational meaning. Furthermore, experiments, together with 
simulations, can help disentangle the complex relations between the micro-motives and the macro-
behaviour of economic systems (as Thomas Schelling (1978) had long ago pointed out in a 
wonderfully inspiring book), once fictitious simplifications such as that of the `representative agent’ 
are abandoned.  
 
 
2. Individual preferences and rationality 
 
Among the most basic tenets of economics is the notion of preferences, with its declination in terms 
of time preferences and risk preferences.  Utility theory simply derives from such primitives as a 
convenient mathematical formulation of preferences, and people’s attitudes toward different degrees 
of risk are conveniently rendered through the addition of a risk parameter to the utility function.  
 
Economists are so used to modelling individual behaviour using these categories that most of them 
simply take them for granted as fundamental `first principles’ from which everything else derives. It 
is curious in this respect to consider how economists, in their continuous effort to render economics 
a history-free discipline, seem totally unaware of the historical origin of many of the notions that 
they so carelessly utilize everyday as their habitual modelling tools.  The notion of utility itself has a 
long history dating back at least to Bentham, where the term was used to refer to the – supposedly – 
fundamental drivers of human behaviour, pleasure and pain. Then, as it is well known, such 
hedonic flavour completely disappeared in the modern conception of utility as numerical expression 
of well-defined preferences, before being rediscovered in recent years thanks to the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Kahneman and his collaborators (e.g., Kahneman, Wakker, 
Sarin, 1997).  
 
Preferences then became the fundamental building blocks to describe the behaviour of economic 
agents, with the only constraint given by an internal consistency requirement, i.e., the need for 
preferences to be coherent and relatively stable over time and over contexts.  
 
Finally, although in principle no restrictions are imposed as regards the arguments of the utility 
function of a particular individual (which may contain reference to one’s own as well to other 
individuals’ well being), the notion of utility maximization has increasingly been equated de facto 
with the maximization of one’s own material interest.  
 
However, as Albert Hirschman points out, it was only recently in the history of thought that the 
notion of interest acquired a special relevance as an innate driver of human behaviour, replacing   6
“the two categories that had dominated the analysis of human motivation since Plato, namely, the 
passions on the one hand, and reason on the other” (Hirschman, 1977, p. 43).  Quite interestingly, 
the adoption of interest as a new paradigm to interpret human motivation had been accepted with 
intellectual enthusiasm mainly because it seemed to confer behaviour a greater predictability, given 
that passions were too volatile and reason appeared ineffectual (Hirschman, 1977).  
 
However, decades of research in experimental economics and behavioural decision theory have 
seriously undermined the usefulness of such mental constructs as self-interest and preferences to 
model human behaviour in a coherent manner. What experiments have repeatedly shown is that 
behaviour - as measured and judged on the basis of adherence to an underlying set of coherent and 
stable preferences that the individual aims at satisfying given available information and budget 
constraints- is so sensitive to theoretically irrelevant factors such as context, labels, emotional states, 
to put into question the adequacy of using such mental categories to model decision making in a 
way that may prove descriptively sound. In the following we briefly report a (necessarily 
incomplete) list of findings: ??? A), B) … 
 
Perhaps no piece of evidence is so simply and yet powerfully representative of humans’ behavioural 
inconsistency as the evidence on preference reversal. At the same time, perhaps no other piece of 
evidence has been so disturbing for economists, who in fact have tried hard to eradicate the 
phenomenon, without quite succeeding. The first experiments on preference reversal were run by 
the psychologists Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and involved the two (perfectly equivalent, 
according to standard theory) tasks of choosing between two lotteries and pricing those same two 
lotteries. The lotteries were designed so that one offered a larger probability of winning a smaller 
amount of money, and the other offered a lower probability of winning a larger sum. The 
experiments show that individuals typically choose the first lottery in the `choosing’ task while 
pricing the second lottery higher in the `pricing’ task. Psychologists labelled this finding as a 
violation of the principle of `procedure invariance’, which states that alternative but logically 
equivalent methods to elicit one’s preferences should yield identical results. Psychological theories 
also offered a simple explanation for the finding, namely that subjects focus more on the money 
dimension when asked to price a lottery, while they pay more attention to the probability dimension 
when choosing. The experiments were then replicated by Grether and Plott (1979) in the hope to 
make the effect disappear once subjects would be given the right incentives and tighter control. But 
the violation persisted, and subsequent studies have demonstrated its robustness to varying 
experimental designs (see Camerer, 1995, for an extensive review).  
 
Another fruitful area of research for experimental and behavioural economics is inter-temporal 
choice.  Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) offer a comprehensive survey of the 
experimental evidence on time preference, together with an assessment of the state-of-the-art in 
models of inter-temporal decisions that try to incorporate some of the behavioural findings. Here we 
will only report a small subset of the evidence that they discuss. Time preference is a research area 
where the largest part of the experiments has been conducted by psychologists, although economists 
have replicated in some occasions using real monetary incentives. However, economists have 
produced a wide range of behavioural models of inter-temporal choice that attempt at explaining 
observed anomalies in savings and consumption decisions (Laibson, 1998), in principal-agent 
relationships (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) and many others (see  Frederick et al., 2002, and 
references therein).  
 
As it is well known, standard economics solves the inter-temporal choice problem by assuming it 
away through the adoption of the discounted utility model (DU) (Samuelson, 1937).  Under DU, all 
the motivations that drive decisions involving consumption that will occur at different moments in 
the future are subsumed under a single discounting parameter.  It is difficult to underestimate the   7
elegance and mathematical convenience of such simple formulation; however, and quite intuitively, 
experiments have highlighted numerous violations of the model.  Furthermore, such violations 
cannot by any means be considered “mistakes”, since there is no compelling argument to consider 
the DU model normatively correct (Frederick et al., 2002).  For example, there is psychological 
evidence that individuals do not discount the future at a constant rate; rather, implicit discount rates 
tend to decline over time (e.g., Thaler, 1981; Benzion, Rapoport, Ygil, 1989). This evidence has 
been incorporated in models of inter-temporal decisions that involve hyperbolic instead of 
exponential discounting, which have been mainly applied to explain a vast array of stylized facts in 
consumption and savings behaviours (see, e.g., Laibson, 1994, 1997). However, further evidence 
(e.g., Rubinstein, 2000) shows that hyperbolic discounting can be as easily violated in experiments 
as exponential discounting, suggesting the need to incorporate changes in models that go beyond the 
simple substitution of a given functional form with another.  
 
Further experiments have shown that individuals tend to prefer sequences of outcomes that show 
improvement over time (like, e.g., increasing wage profiles) to alternative sequences that allow 
strictly higher amounts of consumption in every period but show declining rates (Hsee, Abelson and 
Salovey, 1991). Moreover, gains seem to be discounted at a higher rate than losses, and large 
outcomes are discounted differently than small ones (e.g., Thaler, 1981).   
 
Among the models that try to incorporate some of the evidence, to name a few, are models of habit 
formation (Abel, 1990; Jermann, 1998; Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher, 2001), models implying 
game-theoretic interactions between multiple-selves - aimed at modelling self-control and 
procrastination problems, which are assumed to be at the core of many empirically tested examples 
of time inconsistency (e.g., Elster, 1985) - models of referent-dependent utility which incorporate 
some ideas from Prospect Theory (e.g., Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), models that incorporate 
anticipatory emotions such as anxiety, suspense and “savouring” (Loewenstein, 1987; Caplin and 
Leahy, 2001). 
  
While most of these models generally offer a better account of the evidence compared to the 
standard discounted utility framework, nonetheless they are usually able to explain only part of the 
observed violations. Rather, the experimental evidence seems to suggest that multiple motives lie at 
the base of inter-temporal decisions. In addition, the empirical correlation between different 
measures of time preference, and between time preferences for different choice domains seems 
rather weak.  
 
Loewenstein, Weber, Flory, Manuck and Muldoon (2001) try to `unpack’ the concept of time 
preference by explicit reference to its constituent motives, which they identify in impulsivity, 
compulsivity, and inhibition. The first component is responsible for spontaneous, unplanned acts, the 
second for careful forward-looking decisions and the third component for the taming of impulsive 
behaviour. The authors argue that such dimensions can be measured quite reliably in individuals, 
and seem to predict different types of behaviours quite well (so, for example, various types of 
impulsive and visceral behaviours result positively correlated with impulsivity and negatively 
correlated with inhibition).  
 
All in all, research on time preference has conclusively demonstrated the total inadequacy of the DU 
model and the need to search for radically different (and, possibly, empirically-driven) `first 
principles’ to describe human choices over time.  
 
A related domain of research on preferences has to do with the measurement of their degree of 
coherence and arbitrariness. The questions that these types of experiments try to answer are the 
following: “to what extent do individuals posses a coherent set of stable preferences that pre-exist at   8
the moment of choice?”  “To what extent do preferences reflect some (subjective) fundamental 
valuation?” “Are people aware of their own preferences, even after they have accumulated 
experience?” The answers coming from experiments seem largely negative for all these questions.  
A considerable body of evidence has accumulated in the last twenty years about the extreme 
sensitivity of preferences (as revealed by observed choices) to normatively irrelevant factors, such 
as for example the contextual elements of choice. The influence of context may take the form of 
framing effects, reference-dependence, choice-menu effects, and the like (see, e.g., Devetag, 1999, 
Mellers et al., 1998, for a survey).  The evidence so far accumulated strongly highlights the 
inadequacy of the traditional economic depiction of individuals as characterized by clearly 
identifiable, complete and coherent preference sets.  
 
In a more recent experimental work, Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003) conduct experiments 
aimed at testing whether preferences that subjects exhibit can be said to be related to some 
“fundamental” valuation or, on the contrary, exhibit a certain amount of arbitrariness. To this 
purpose, they borrow an experimental device used by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and expose 
experimental subjects to a randomly generated numerical value (the “anchor”) before asking 
subjects to place a monetary value on some sets of consumer goods or “hedonic” experiences (such 
as listening for a certain amount of seconds to a highly unpleasant noise). In one of such 
experiments, a group of student subjects was shown a series of consumer products (e.g., wine 
bottles and PC accessories), each accompanied by a brief description but without any mention of its 
market price. Subsequently, subjects were asked to state whether they would buy each of the 
products for a price equal to the last two digits of their social security number (the random “anchor” 
value). Finally, subjects were asked to state the maximum price they would be willing to pay (their 
WTP, or “willingness to pay”) to purchase any of the goods.  The “anchor” value was manipulated 
so as to make it transparent to subjects that it was clearly randomly drawn and had no connection 
whatsoever with the value of the products.  Incentives were controlled through the well-known 
Becker-De-groot-Marschak procedure, which determined, through the use of a random device, 
whether the product would actually be sold to the subject on the basis of the first or second question 
asked. Subjects knew the procedure and knew that they could buy at most one product, so in 
principle they had a monetary incentive to reveal their “true” subjective evaluations.   
 
Despite the explicit transparency to subjects of the random nature of the “anchor”, the results show 
a highly significant anchoring effect in subjects’ evaluations of the goods, in that subjects with 
social security numbers above the group median stated values for products that were from 57 to 107 
higher than values stated by subjects with below-median social security numbers, and the difference 
is even more striking when comparing the average evaluation of the top quintile ($56) with that of 
the bottom quintile ($16). The authors refer to this effect as “arbitrariness” of preferences with 
respect to absolute evaluations. However, what emerges from the data is subjects’ coherence in 
relative evaluations: for example, most subjects coherently valued the highly rated wine more than 
the poorly rated wine, and generally seemed to know the relative ranking of products within each 
category.  
 
Such baseline experiment was replicated involving valuations of pain experiences instead of 
consumer goods to eliminate the possible influence of previous purchase episodes on subjects’ 
evaluations; furthermore, the experiments allowed subjects to have a sample of the pain experience 
before making the evaluation. Finally, in one of the replications subjects’ WTA (“willingness to 
accept”, or the minimum price that they would be willing to receive to experience the pain for a 
certain time) was elicited using a multi-person auction, with the purpose of testing whether market 
forces would make the anchoring effect disappear.  
   9
Their general results highlight the robustness of anchoring effects and their resistance to experience 
and to market forces. Overall, these data suggest that there is a strong element of arbitrariness in 
individuals’ absolute evaluations, although people subsequently show “local” coherence when 
adjusting their judgments in response to variations in a neighbourhood of the initial, arbitrary 
“anchor”.  Hence, to the extent that people seem to respond consistently to changes, such as for 
example, changes in price, they behave “as if” they were revealing a coherent set of stable and well-
known “true” preferences. However, to the extent that such supposedly true preferences appear to be 




3. Social preferences  
 
A related area of recent research in experimental economics deals with strategic interaction as 
modelled by game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  A large subset of experimental 
work in this area has to do with the study of altruism and other-regarding preferences, with the 
purpose of testing the traditional view of homo oeconomicus as motivated solely by self-interest. As 
Colin Camerer (2003) noted, results in this area of experimental investigation typically surprise only 
economists. In fact, what most of these studies show is that individuals show altruism to some 
extent, exhibit cooperative behaviours in a variety of contexts, assign high importance to fairness 
and equality considerations, and show consistent degrees of both positive and negative reciprocation 
(reciprocating altruistic acts and punishing unfair acts, even when these acts come at a cost to 
themselves). All in all, hadn’t it been for decades of brain-washing with the “self-interest” 
assumption of canonical economic theorizing, these findings would hardly surprise anyone, as any 
economist who has ever attempted to explain the results of these studies to non-economists will be 
ready to acknowledge. Experimental research on social preferences exhibits maybe to the highest 
degree the benefits of the cumulative progress in knowledge that series of experiments permit to 
achieve through the interplay of simple theory-testing motivations (such as the emergence of the 
subgame-perfect equilibrium in the ultimatum game), intense (D-Q)-type criticism, and further 
careful experimentation that builds upon previous studies refining features of the experimental 
design or varying the subject population. By now, the evidence on altruism and reciprocation is 
immense, and has resisted various attempts at demolishing it to restore the re-assuring canonical 
image of the self-interested economic agent (for a detailed and updated critical survey, see Camerer, 
2003).  
 
The early research on social preferences elected for decades the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma as the 
prototype-game to study violations of self-interested behaviour and the emergence of cooperation in 
simple settings. And the Prisoner’s Dilemma has a long history of experimental testing, since its 
conception, as Mirowski aptly narrated. As Merrill Flood and Melvin Drecher invented the PD in 
January 1950, their essential motivation was “to expose the way that social relationships mattered 
for economic outcomes” (Mirowski, 2002: 356; also Morgan, 2001) and, in particular, to challenge 
Nash’s concept of equilibria for non-cooperative games, since it was based on dubious dummies for 
rational behavior. It was because of that strategy that the payoff matrix was designed in order to 
contrast the Nash equilibrium with the alternative equilibrium emerging out of maximization of 
payoffs from cooperative strategies. The curious anedocte is that Flood invited two colleagues at 
Rand, Armen Alchian and John Williams, an economist and a mathematician, to play the game 100 
times for pennies, asking both to note their observations on the successive events.  
 
The fact is that Alchian the economist chose cooperation 68 times out of 100, and Williams the 
mathematician chose it 78 times. Their notes illustrate the asymmetry of expectations: Alchian 
predicted defection whereas Williams expected cooperation (Mirowski, ibid,: 357-9). But the most   10
impressive fact was the difficulty of communication, as a product of the inability of learning in the 
universe of skewed payoffs: social life was indeed limited by ‘rationality’. Nash reacted to this 
experiment suggesting that the world would be perfect if interaction was eliminated from the game: 
“”It is really striking, however, how inefficient AA and JW are in obtaining rewards. One would 
have thought them more rational. If this experiment were conducted with various different players 
rotating the competition and with no information given to a player of what choices the others have 
been making until the end of all trials, then the experimental results would have been quite different, 
for this modification would remove the interaction between the trials” (qu. in Mirowski, ibid.: 359). 
Certainly, with no interaction the problem of learning would be dismissible.  
 
Either because of these challenges or because of the PD’s narrowness in explaining individual 
behavior in social interaction, the fact is that more recently increasing attention has been given to 
the ultimatum game and to the trust game, which are both considered as more suitable than the PD 
to discriminate among alternative explanations of the results (for example, in case of defection in 
the PD it is not possible to distinguish between a truly rational and self-interested individual and a 
conditional cooperator with pessimistic beliefs about her opponent). As is well known, the 
ultimatum game is a simple sequential bargaining game with two players, a Proposer and a 
Responder. The Proposer has a sum of money, which she has to decide how to allocate between 
herself and the Respondent.  
 
The Responder may accept the allocation proposed, in which case the money is split among the two 
accordingly, or reject it, in which case neither receives anything. The game-theoretic prediction 
prescribes that the responder, being only interested in the maximization of his monetary payoff, will 
accept any positive offer, however small. The Proposer, being able to anticipate the responder’s 
behaviour, will propose an extremely unfair allocation, giving only the minimum possible to the 
Responder and keeping the rest for herself. Clearly, things go very differently in reality. In the 
typical one-shot ultimatum game with a condition of total anonymity, offers by the Proposers vary 
from 40% to 50% of the entire pie, and quite often offers below 20% are rejected. A variation of the 
game called the dictator game, in which the Responder has no influence on the final allocation, 
offers from the Proposers are generally lower than in the ultimatum game, suggesting that the 
Proposer’s behaviour in the ultimatum game is not entirely due to altruism but, to some extent, also 
to strategic considerations (i.e., fear of rejection); however, offers in the dictator game show a much 
higher variability than in the ultimatum game, and seem to be much more sensitive to the contextual 
features of the experimental design (such as, for example, the use of “double blind” procedures that 
prevent even the experimenter from knowing the dictator’s allocation decision, or having the 
dictator receive a brief description of the recipient before a decision is made). 
  
Raising the stakes to sums that amount to one-month salary of the experimental subjects changes the 
results very little, as does allowing for repetition (although both offers and rejection rates tend to 
decline over time).   
 
In the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) a subject (player 1) receives a sum T; she can 
decide to invest the entire sum or part of it by giving it to player 2, which then receives by the 
experimenter Κ times whatever he has received from player 1 (K>1); player 2 then must decide how 
much (if anything) give back to player 1. Game theory would prescribe that player 2 will keep all 
the money for himself; player 1, anticipating this behaviour, should give nothing to player 2. In the 
lab, subjects typically give half of their endowment to player 2, who in turn give back to player 1 a 
sum more or less equal to the initial investment. The game nicely captures situations of pure trust, 
whereby a player can decide to take a risky action (investing the money rather keeping it) in the 
hope that the other player will reciprocate trust, even at a cost to himself. The degree of trust is 
implicitly measured by the amount invested by player 1, and the degree of trustworthiness by the   11
amount player 2 gives back. The fact that in a situation of total anonymity and one-shot interaction, 
most subjects decide to trust the other (unknown) player is a result that is slightly more surprising 
than behaviour in the ultimatum game, since a risk-averse norm that says “it’s safer not to trust 
strangers” might have been easily transferred to the lab environment (however, it must be noted that 
trust is not very well repaid on average). Data from the trust game thus seem to identify the 
existence of a sort of “minimum” trust level among members of a society (since it arises in absence 
of any typical trust-enhancing condition such as reciprocal knowledge, repeated interaction, and so 
forth), and the fact that such level is above zero is not at all a trivial result.   
 
Behaviour of the responders in the ultimatum game is often interpreted in terms of subjects coming 
to the lab with a set of pre-codified social norms that guide them in their daily, repeated interactions 
outside the lab, and `mistakenly’ applying these norms to the one-shot context of the experiment, in 
absence perhaps of other clues due to the relative unfamiliarity of the laboratory environment (see 
also Camerer and Fehr, 2003).  However, individuals seem able to capture the difference between 
repeated and one-shot games. Fehr and Fischbacher (2001) conducted experiments on repeated UG 
under two differing treatments. In one case, subjects played each time with a new opponent and the 
proposers were not informed about the past behaviour of the responders they were facing; in another 
treatment, proposers were allowed to know the history of the responder’s choices up to that time. 
The second treatment clearly creates an opportunity for reputation formation; in fact, the responders 
have an incentive to reject low offers in early rounds, knowing that this information will be made 
available to the proposers, to increase the probability to receive high offers in later rounds. The data 
show that indeed, most responders take advantage of the `reputation formation’ opportunity by 
raising their acceptance threshold (i.e., by rejecting higher offers, on average, than in the control 
treatment). These results show that individuals are perfectly able to distinguish between one-shot 
and repeated interactions, and modify their behaviour accordingly.  Hence, it seems implausible to 
think of responders’ behaviour in the standard UG as triggered by the automatic application of a 
social norm to a mistakenly perceived situation.  
 
Rather, the data suggest that social norms, although being nurtured in centuries of evolution through 
tight, face-to-face social contact and repeated interaction, possess nonetheless a property of 
`abstractness’ that cause them to emerge even in the social vacuum of the laboratory environment 
among pools of perfect strangers; hence, a responder in the ultimatum game might `rationally’ 
decide to punish an unfair offer either out of a purely visceral reaction of anger, or also with the 
purpose to teach the other person to adhere to a norm of fairness in the future, even though most 
likely he won’t be the direct beneficiary of such a change in attitude (though he may indirectly 
benefit from it, as long as fairness norms are increasingly adopted by members of a population).  
The fact that in multi-person public goods or dictator games, indirect punishment is observed (i.e., 
punishment by a third party who is not at all personally affected by the unfair act of the person 
being punished) is a further indication of the fact that – probably – the one-shot interaction of the 
lab is taken just as a temporal episode of a much larger game among members of a society.  
 
Among the more recent studies on the ultimatum game, the work by Henrich et al. (2001a, 2001b; 
see also Bowles et al. 2003) stands out as particularly rich and innovative. A pool of economists and 
anthropologists has conducted experiments on the trust, ultimatum and dictator games with subjects 
belonging to 15 different small-scale societies around the world. The societies were carefully 
selected so as to present very heterogeneous characteristics in terms of economic organization and 
social and cultural traits.  The basic results of this cross-cultural study can be summarized as 
follows: first, the canonical prediction of self-interested behaviour is never observed in any of the 
societies investigated. Second, there is a considerably higher variability across groups than in any 
previous cross-cultural study of this type. The behaviour of the proposers in the UG vary widely in 
the sample populations, with mean offers ranging from 26 to 58 per cent, and modal offers from 15   12
to 50 percent. Similarly, behaviours of the respondents in the sample include rejections of offers 
larger than 50% of the pie, and acceptance of offers below 20%.  Third, a large part of the cross-
group variability can be explained by society-level differences in the degree of economic 
organization, as measured by two key variables: 1) the magnitude of payoffs to cooperation, and 2) 
the degree of market integration.  The first variable measures the extent to which economic 
production within a society is based on group activities that require the cooperation of members 
beyond the family domain (such as for example, whale-hunting). If such cooperative activities are 
largely responsible for the surplus produced, these societies must necessarily develop norms that 
govern surplus sharing. The second variable measures the extent to which members of the society 
rely on some form of exchange. The larger the diffusion of exchange habits, the higher should be 
the development of abstract sharing norms that hold with kins and strangers alike.  
 
With regard to the behaviour of proposers in the UG, the authors find that offers are positively and 
significantly correlated with the two variables, which can account for roughly 60 per cent of the 
observed between-group variability in behaviour, while individual-level variables such as sex, age, 
income do not seem to bear any explanatory power.  Hence, willingness to cooperate and share 
seems to be positively correlated with the intensity of market exchange and cooperative economic 
production existing within a society. These findings are remarkable for several reasons; first, they 
suggest that individuals responded to the new situation of the experiment by comparing it to 
corresponding familiar situations in their daily lives, and acted accordingly. In other words, people 
seem to have brought their own life experience into the lab, which should be good news for all 
experimental economics, since it suggests that the behaviour we generally observe in our 
experimental laboratories is after all not very distant from what happens in the `real’ world. In other 
words, these results increase our confidence in the `ecological’ validity of the experiments.  
 
Secondly, the results support the hypothesis that preferences are endogenously generated through 
the influence of economic and cultural institutions and are not an exogenous datum, as mainstream 
economics usually postulates. Third, the development of market institutions, maybe counter-
intuitively, seems to foster rather than inhibit fairness and altruism-based norms of behaviour.  
 
 
4. Social rationality: experimental game theory 
 
While the first two sections have briefly reviewed contemporary research issues on preferences, 
here we will telegraphically highlight some of the key issues that are currently being investigated in 
the domain of social interaction as exemplified and modelled by game theory.  
 
As it is well known, standard game theory (by standard we mean game theory as it is explained in 
advanced textbooks) is a highly formal mathematical language used to describe the behaviour of 
super-rational individuals in strategic contexts. Although being born as a branch of applied 
mathematics and having been originally developed with the intention of making it the science of 
military conflict, its diffusion within economics has been rapid and overwhelming, and related fields 
of the social sciences like law and political science have recently began to make an extensive use of 
it. While nowadays theoretical and applied I.O., contract theory, microeconomics, and even 
individual decision theory as applied to inter-temporal choice are completely pervaded by subtle 
game-theoretic nuances and increasingly sophisticated and obscure equilibrium concepts, it is quite 
interesting to note that, already in the 40s, several military officers at RAND corporation, where 
game theory had had its initial moments of glory, soon started to be absolutely dissatisfied with its 
developments, and began to consider its whole analytical apparatus simply irrelevant as an aid to 
solve complex international policy problems. Philip Mirowski (2002), in his historical 
reconstruction of the intellectual and political fervour of those years at RAND, reports a couple of   13
quite illuminating statements. Alex Mood, responsible for the game theory section at RAND, wrote 
that the theory of games “has developed a considerable body of clarifying ideas and a technique 
which can analyze quite simple economic and tactical problems…these techniques are not even 
remotely capable, however, of dealing with complex military problems” (qu. in Mirowski, 2002: 
323).  In a similar spirit, Edward Quade stated:  
“Game theory turned out to be one of these things that helped you think about the problem and gives 
you maybe a way of talking about the problem, but you can’t take one of these systems analysis 
problems and set it up in a game and solve the game. Only in the very simplest cases would you 
actually be able to get a game theory solution. It gives you a background of how to think about a 
problem. I find discussions like the discussion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma—its very helpful in 
illuminating your thought but you don’t solve the problem that way, you know.” (interview with 
Edward Quade, qu. in Mirowski, ibid.: 329).  
 
What was already obvious to military officers fifty years ago seems yet not so obvious to 
mainstream economists fifty years later: namely, that game theory can be a useful tool to analyze 
strategic interaction problems in a novel and rigorous way, but its solution concepts are largely 
irrelevant except for the simplest games (and even here there might be disagreement, as Quade’s 
opinion about the way to “solve” the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests).  
 
It was Thomas Schelling’s book on The strategy of Conflict, published in 1960, which rejuvenated 
the interest in the theory of games as something that could be actually applied to real strategic 
problems (Mirowski, 2002). Interestingly, Schelling’s book does not contain a single formula; 
instead, it is full of semantically poignant concepts (`focal point’ being the prominent example) and 
hardly uses any game-theoretic tools beyond the payoff-matrix.  
 
Experimental economics as applied to strategic interaction has contributed significantly to putting 
life back into game theory, thus increasing its descriptive relevance, its predictive capabilities and 
its prescriptive value. Basic game theory, in fact, can be quite usefully applied as an abstract 
language that permits to classify the infinite variation of socio-economic interactions between two 
or more individuals on the basis of a few basic features (see also Camerer (2003) on this point). In 
Schelling’s words: “the greatest contribution of game theory to social science in the end is simply 
the payoff matrix itself that, like a truth table of a conservation principle or an equation, provides a 
way of organizing and structuring problems so that they can be analyzed fruitfully and 
communicated unambiguously (qu. in Mirowski, ibid.: 330).  Experimental game theory has taken 
the basic tools of game theory and has substituted most of its arcane equilibrium concepts with 
`reasonable’ predictions inferred from the experimental evidence.  
 
To summarize in a nutshell some of the developments in this area: it is by now largely 
acknowledged even by the most orthodox defenders of equilibrium concepts that, assuming players 
interacting in a game do play consistently with Nash equilibrium, they do so only after a process of 
learning and not right from the start. Literature on learning in repeated games has literally burst in 
the last decade, and several competing models have been tested against each other in comparison 
with experimental data (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999). The two 
main families of learning models are reinforcement learning, which assumes players base their 
choices of strategy in every round only on the basis of their past earnings’ history and without 
forming beliefs about the behaviour of the opponent, and belief-based learning models, which on the 
contrary assume players keep track of the opponent’s behaviour to formulate a best reply. Evidence 
is mixed, although reinforcement models seem to not capture learning patterns very well in context 
in which information about the behaviour of others is available, since human subjects seem to 
respond to a certain extent to the moves of other players when given the opportunity to observe 
them. Some hybrid models (Camerer and Ho, 1999; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002) which combine   14
features from both families seem to fit data well in some classes of games. Literature on learning 
has contributed significantly to obtain important insights on out-of-equilibrium behaviour in 
interactive context, although it must be said that these studies rely on a somewhat restrictive notion 
of learning itself, implicitly or explicitly identifying it with ``adaptive behaviour'', i.e., the process 
by which people interacting with each other or with ``Nature'' modify their actions in the effort of - 
supposedly - improving their performance. Few would object to the fact that learning as the word is 
normally used in common language hints at a far more comprehensive set of cognitive and 
behavioural processes, of which the realm of adaptive behaviour just defined may constitute nothing 
but a small part. A university student who learns the principles of quantum physics, or a musician 
who learns to play the piano probably share very little with experimental subjects who “learn'” (or 
do not learn) to pick the best available action (amongst a fixed set) to respond to their opponents in 
a stationary world. In other words, learning processes in real life involve far more than just actions, 
but include changes in procedural routines as well as in (more or less conscious and elaborate) 
mental representations. A few experimental studies have recently started to address the issue. Merlo 
and Schotter (1999), for example, have shown that in repeated experiments, subjects tend to learn 
different aspects of the task depending on whether they receive an immediate payoff according to 
performance in each single trial, or, on the contrary, are let to play `for free' for a while in view of a 
single, final shot in which they get paid. In the latter case, subjects' performances substantially 
improve. The authors argue that the first payoff environment renders subjects more myopic and 
adaptive, while the second induces more farsighted and intelligent explorations in the space of 
solutions. Weber (2003) has studied learning in a dominance-solvable game in which subjects 
receive no feedback about other players’ choices in previous rounds.  Studying learning in no-
feedback conditions is important in order to test whether subjects are able to change their behaviour 
over time on the basis of some abstract reasoning about the game’s features, rather than simply by 
reacting to others’ behaviour. Moreover, in many real world situations, feedback is missing or 
ambiguous, hence the importance of studying no-feedback learning in the lab.  
 
Other important findings concern behaviour in coordination games. Coordination games are 
characterized by the existence of multiple equilibria, which makes predictions often indeterminate. 
Furthermore, some of the proposed equilibrium refinements seem to have a dubious validity.   
Collecting a large body of experimental evidence in this class of games thus seems particularly 
compelling in order to build empirically-sound theories of equilibrium selection. Coordination 
games can be roughly divided in two classes: those with equilibria that are payoff-equivalent for all 
players involved (like matching games or experimental market entry games) and those whose 
equilibria can be Pareto-ranked. The first experiments on the latter class of games were conducted in 
the early 90’s by Van Huyck and his collaborators at Texas A&M University, and their first results 
generated a considerable stream of further experiments. Their findings are remarkable in that they 
demonstrate how easily coordination failure may arise in a simple setting in which players have full 
information about the game structure and payoffs. In particular, in their experiment on the median 
action game (Van Huyck et al. 1991), the end of game equilibrium was always determined by the 
historical accident of first period play, and it was always an inefficient equilibrium. Economists who 
deny the existence of strong forms of history-dependence in economic life (e.g., Margolis and 
Liebowitz, 1995) should pay attention to these results. In the experiments on the minimum effort 
game (Van Huyck et al. 1990) the limit outcome was always the most inefficient one.  
 
Several other studies have investigated the conditions that might affect coordination in these games. 
Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1993) have imposed participation costs to players such as to rule out 
inefficient equilibria by forward induction. Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998) have proved that an 
extended time horizon improves coordination in the minimum effort game. Keser, Ehrhart and 
Berninghaus (1998) have shown that the nature of interaction (local versus global) also matters in 
determining which equilibrium will be selected. Goeree and Holt (1999) have shown that changes in   15
the payoff function such as reducing the costs of deviation from equilibrium play, substantially 
improve coordination in the minimum effort game. Allowing pre-play costless signaling was shown 
to increase efficiency in the median action game (Blume and Ortmann, 2000). In a similar game 
(Devetag, 2003), players were able to `hill-climb’ the strategy space in a coordinated manner due to 
costly signalling by some of the players who chose to `teach’ others the path to the efficient 
equilibrium.  
 
Overall, these studies highlight that convergence to efficient equilibria in coordination games is far 
from trivial. At the same time, there are several conditions that improve the efficiency of the 
achieved coordination, either by increasing the individual incentive to engage in risky explorations, 
or by allowing players to influence each other's beliefs and actions through their choices.  
 
While the evidence on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria points at the ubiquity of 
coordination failure, experimental findings on games with Pareto-equivalent equilibria show on the 
contrary how coordination success can emerge in the aggregate almost `by magic’ (Kahneman, 
1988) out of heterogeneous, boundedly rational strategies that do not seem to appeal to any 
equilibrium principle. This invocation of magic and invisible wizards able to concoct the ingredients 
of exuberant irrational behavior in order to produce a rational potion is indeed a recursive feature of 
some literature in experimental economics, and Kahneman should be aware of illustrious 
precedence: ‘Why is that human subjects in the laboratory violate the canons of rational choice 
when tested as isolated individuals, but in the social context of exchange institutions serve up 
decisions that are consistent (as though by magic) with predictive models based on individual 
rationality?’ (Smith, 1991: 894). Vernon Smith, who conceived the program of experimental 
economics as designed to repair the averages of the rationality postulate, is right to call for the spell 
of magic to save the concept of equilibrium.  
 
To be fair, it must be ascertained that both Kahneman and Smith frequently crossed borders of the 
that traditional concept of rationality. Kahneman, a behaviouralist, made a career emphasising the 
differences between homo economicus and the more pedestrian homo sapiens. And Vernon Smith 
argued, at his Nobel lecture, for a difference to be established between constructivist, i.e. deductivist 
and theoretical rationality according to the neoclassical pattern, and “ecological rationality” based 
on the understanding of emergent rules from social interaction and coordination in a smithian way 
(Smith, 2003). 
 
Game theory explored several instances of these dilemmas. Market-entry games are one instance of 
such games in which n players must decide whether or not to enter a market with a certain fixed 
capacity c, where c is usually < n.  If the number of entrants is above the market capacity, all 
entrants suffer losses, while if entrants are less than c, opportunities for gain are left unexploited. In 
some cases players who decide to stay out earn a fixed positive payoff. Several experiments have 
shown that the number of entrants in each period is remarkably close to the market capacity c, 
although outcomes vary widely depending on features of the experimental design such as, e.g., the 
parameters of the payoff function, group size, matching protocol (e.g., Zwick and Rapoport, 2000).  
In some cases, groups seem to self-organize so as to achieve a higher degree of coordination than 
that implied by the mixed strategy equilibrium solution (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2003).  Recent 
experiments investigate coordination patterns in more complex environments, such as players 
interacting over a network with both exogenous and endogenous link formation (Corbae and Duffy, 
2000). Other very innovative experiments have started to explore the emergence of linguistic 
coordination in complex tasks (Weber and Camerer, 2003). These last studies show the creative 
potential of experimental research, especially when it is implied as a means to discover behavioural 
patterns without being too constrained by the obsession of theory-testing.  
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5. What to make of the evidence?      
 
The neoclassical economics’ image of the economic agent is that of an individual who is perfectly 
able to state his preferences in a coherent manner for whatever pairs of goods possibly conceivable 
whose consumption can occur at any moment in time between now and the remote future; and who 
coldly accepts an extremely unfair treatment from another agent as long as there is some (however 
small) material reward to achieve. This is not meant to say that the traditional conception of perfect 
rationality has not evolved at all within the mainstream economics tradition; however, the core of 
the discipline by and large persists with the “business as usual” approach of relying on optimization 
techniques to model economic behaviour. 
  
The evidence here discussed shows a radically different picture: real humans sometimes experience 
difficulties in making complicated tradeoffs between consumption of different goods at different 
moments in time, sometimes reveal inconsistent preferences and sometimes simply do not know 
how much to value things they are not familiar with and hence rely on all sorts of arbitrary clues. At 
the same time, real humans do not grow up in a social vacuum, but, on the contrary, are 
continuously engaged in all types of social interactions with other individuals and have developed 
relatively stable patterns of behaviour based on simple norms such as reciprocity and cooperation. 
Hence, they happen to punish unfair treatments, even though this may cost them something. 
Furthermore, they are not hyper-rational but they are capable, to some extent, to reason about the 
behaviour of other agents and devise, if not optimal, sensible behavioural heuristics that at times 
happen to produce remarkably efficient aggregate results (…but not always!).  
 
All in all, these findings seem to vindicate years of contemptuous dismissal on the part of 
mainstream economists of the criticism coming from economic sociologists, namely the formers’ 
obsession with methodological individualism and the belief that the economy could be studied in 
isolation from the other aspects of society. As it is well known, economics has proceeded in its own 
way by and large ignoring the critiques. However, the findings on the experiments on social 
preferences recall ideas and concepts that were already familiar to economic sociologists fifty years 
ago. For example, Polanyi extensively analyzed primitive economies and he defined  `reciprocity’ 
as one of the basic templates of economic action to be found in all societies (Polanyi, Arensberg and 
Pearson, 1957).  Likewise, both Polany (Polanyi et al. 1957) and Granovetter (1985) long ago 
introduced the notion of `embeddedness’ to refer to the need to consider economic transactions as 
occurring within a larger network of social relations. In some sense, therefore, it might be said that 
contemporary experimental economics is bringing economics back to the past of its sister social 
sciences. However, the innovation consists in the methodology implied, which combines the 
advantages of the experimental method with the rigorous analytical classification of social 
interactions provided by basic game theory. Furthermore, if economists have a lot to learn from 
psychologists and sociologists, the reverse is true as well, because experiments also demonstrate 
that individuals respond to incentives in choosing their behaviour. Far from mechanically applying 
pre-codified norms in a semi-automatic mode once a situation gets categorized in a certain way, 
individuals appear sensitive to the incentive structure of the situation they face. Hence, the key issue 
is not that of deciding between the two opposite extremes of homo economicus and homo 
sociologicus, or between methodological individualism and structural determinism, but precisely the 
unpacking of the individual evaluation procedure, in which incentive-driven behaviour combines 
with reason and emotions to produce decision outcomes.  
 
The recent attempts at incorporating the empirical evidence on preferences by means of preserving 
the standard framework of utility maximization (e.g., models of intertemporal choice that utilize 
hyperbolic discounting, utility functions that incorporate reciprocity (Rabin, 1998) and `inequality 
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) do not look convincing for manifold reasons: firstly, they appear   17
to assume the problem away by simply reverting to the canonical maximization paradigm with a 
mere modification of the utility function’s argument. This is an old problem in discussions about 
rationality and self-interest in economics; advocates of the rationality paradigm often argue that 
postulating that agents maximize simply amounts to saying that they do the best they can to choose 
their preferred alternative among their `perceived’ option set. And assuming self-interest merely 
implies that if an agent behaves altruistically, then it is in his self-interest to do so. However, this 
view of rationality and self-interest deprives the two notions of any content, and renders them 
simply unfalsifiable (see Vriend, 1996, for a discussion). Secondly, these models can generally only 
account for part of the evidence, and some can be as easily contradicted by experiments as the more 
traditional ones. Hence, one might still rely on the “as if” assumption in modelling economic 
behaviour in terms of utility maximization and self-interest as long as the predictive power that can 
be gained this way is such to justify the short-cut. When predictions are poor, it might be 
worthwhile to proceed all the way down and inductively search for empirical regularities.  
 
 
6. Finding patterns of structure and evolution: economics back to the Cambridge tradition 
 
Economics evolved and changed, how much strange this may appear to those unadvertised. As the 
first generation of the neoclassical revolution (1871-4) was paradoxically reasserted by the Cowles 
general equilibrium program and the rise of econometrics for structural estimation, the canon was 
slowly displaced to the radical affirmation of rational expectations. And, when the unchallenged 
beauty of the homo economicus was parading, including in game theory, experimental and 
computational economics emerged as new icons for a fin-de-siècle economics turned more 
empirical and realistic. This recent movement was partially surveyed in this paper. 
 
It was not, of course, a smooth and uniform movement. But it was intentional. When Merrill Flood, 
the Robot Sociologist – as Mirowski calls him – and inventor of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, invited 
Herbert Simon to Rand, in 1952, he provided the framework and the intellectual motivation for a 
research on the Turing machines as main tools for simulation. At the same time, von Neumann was 
proposing his theory of automata to represent social institutions, and in particular to conceive of 
markets as evolving computational entities. Both alternatives were contradictory with neoclassical 
economics and its very mode of theorizing, and the authors understood the effect of their deeds. 
Simon explained, quite candidly, that “[when Allan Newell and I began discussing the prospect of 
simulating thinking in the summer of 1954, it was due to] my longstanding discontent with the 
economists’ model of global rationality, which seemed to me to falsify the facts of human behavior 
and to provide a wholly wrong foundation for a theory of human decision making” (Simon, 1979: 
ix). And von Neumann did not even try to hide how much he despised neoclassical economics. 
 
Indeed, both Simon and von Neumann provided tentative escapes from the game-theoretical 
universe of the infinite reproduction of PD as the core of the investigation on the genetic code of 
society. In his 1984 book, “The Evolution of Cooperation”, Axelrod noticed the contamination of 
research, since “The iterated PD has become the E. Coli of social psychology” (Axelrod, 1984: 28), 
and of course this applies to economics as well. Simon and von Neumann, each in a different sense, 
departed from game theory as mimicking experimentation and reinterpreted the social dimension of 
economic behaviour through their simulacra and automata. 
 
The inductive approach we are arguing for values these precursors and these traditions. Indeed, the 
longstanding norm of selection of legitimate theories as those that could provide a formal and 
complete representation of the universe through a self-contained model, proved infectious in 
economics. Binmore denounced one of the implications of this sort of theorizing: “Not only are 
abstractions introduced that do not necessarily admit an operational referent; at the same time,   18
operationally relevant factors are abstracted away together. This, in itself, is not necessarily 
invidious. However, the Bourbakist ethos makes it inevitable that factors that are not taken into 
account of formally are not taken into account at all” (1987: 183). 
 
Abandoning this representation of the action of an agent as a vector in commodity space, several 
economists suggested instead to model the agent as a Turing machine, following Simon (Velupillai, 
2002), or the institutions as algorithms (Scarf, 1989), in any case as information-processors. Along 
the same path, Nelson and Winter had long ago suggested an economic model mimicking some 
biological processes of selection and creation of variation, insisting that processing information and 
taking decision implies a non-mechanical approach (Nelson, Winter, 1982: 68). Although many 
different alternatives are envisageable,
2 it is in the convergence of experimental and computational 
economics that new fields of research, both empirically oriented and theoretically supported, are 
being suggested. 
 
It is true that, for some, this movement is just a reincantation of the past. Kyndland and Prescott, for 
instance, reconstruct the NBER-Cowles debate in order to argue that neoclassical economists should 
not have criticized Mitchell and his followers for lack of theory, since it is convenient to measure 
without theory (Kyndland, Prescott 1990:3) – just as, one might say, calibration is measurement 
without reality. It is beyond the scope of this paper to comment on this topic,
3 but it nevertheless 
should be noted that an inductive approach aims at obtaining information about the structure and 
evolution of the economies in real life, and should preferably not be deviated to statistical 
demonstrations of pure artefacts.
4 
 
While considering these developments, Velupillai registers the failure of identification of 
conservation principles in economics and in social sciences, in contradiction to what happens in 
natural sciences (Velupillai, 2000: 65). Yet, the study of forms of communication and processing of 
information, of the architecture of institutions and in particular of the rules and regulations forming 
markets, suggests that coordination, the maximization of structural stability, is both the relevant 
subject for economics and empirically identifiable. In this framework, coordination refers not to a 
state of equilibrium, since it is an evolving and adaptive process, but to a dynamics of routines, of 
conservation as well as of transformation of societies. In that sense, experiments are relevant, since 
they may provide comparisons on the cultural and social value of information, on group and 
individual learning under different conditions, i.e. the processing of decision making – the Turing 
machines and their human complex counterparts.
5 Consequently, experimental economics promises 
an inductive approach to economics in the rigorous sense of an empirically supported research that 
is not bounded by restrictive notions of social interaction. 
 
But there is also a second possible meaning for an inductive approach. Computational simulation of 
complex behaviour of difficult models is now feasible, what undoubtedly enlarges the role of 
models since permitting more interaction among variables, or nonlinearities. Considering that the 
models are generally underdetermined in relation to the social features they describe, this is a major 
progress. Furthermore, computational simulation permits also different statistical approaches to 
identified processes, using induction in a novel way, for instance challenging the non-critical 
                                                 
2 Mirowski argues that the main contenders are the visions propounded by Kenneth Judd, Alain Lewis, Herbert Simon, 
Daniel Denett, and of course his hero John von Neumann (Mirowski, 2002: 523 f.). 
3 One of us developed a criticism of the RBC literature (Louçã, 2003). 
4 Another implication of an inductive approach is emphasized by Velupillai, who argues that a modern theory of 
induction may provide an alternative to the stochastic approach introduced with the econometric revolution pioneered 
by Haavelmo in economics (Velupillai, 2000: 71 fn). 
5 Bowles and a number of other researchers developed several experiments testing these cultural processes, giving 
experimental economics an anthropological dimension it badly needs (Bowles et al., 2002, 2003).   19
generalization of probabilistic statistics and using alternative statistics based dynamic geometrical 
and topological measures built on the structure of correlations. Computational economics explores 
new ground, for instance a novel approach to dynamics, described as the evolution of geometric 
relations of time series data (e.g., Vilela-Mendes, Araújo, Louçã, 2003), highlighting the changing 
patterns in the structure of the markets and how does it react to extreme events, with are part of the 
story and not undesirable outliers, as it may be the case for conventional smoothing statistics. 
Powerful descriptive statistics may be built on these assumptions, and even probabilistic 
generalizations are possible under disciplined conditions. 
 
There are several reasons for exploring these new inductive methods. One is the evidence of 
widespread nonlinearities in economic series, a trivial hypothesis considering the nature of social 
interaction and structures, which can be empirically and statistically confirmed (Louçã, 1997). 
Indeed, complex nonlinear relations may emerge even in very simple models whether there are 
increasing returns or other externalities, from the simple fact of some agents being price settlers and 
not price takers, from the dynamics of learning, from complex dynamics in preferences and 
technologies and still from the lag structure itself (Brock, Hsieh, LeBaron, 1991: 32-4) – and models 
are timid replications of reality, in which all these factors may combine. Furthermore, this is not 
new: there is a long and respectable tradition in economics, although somewhat misregarded, 
dealing with nonlinearities, from Keynes’ psychological laws and organic unity to Schumpeter’s 
deviant behaviour of entrepreneurs. Nonlinearities are everywhere, simply because they are the 
model representation of social complexity: “No doubt, if our means of investigation should become 
more penetrating, we should discover the simple under the complex, then the complex under the 
simple, then again the simple under the complex, and so on, without our being able to foresee what 
will be the last term (Poincaré, 1903: 132). 
 
But this is no trivial task. For ages, equilibrium became a theory of theories and a paradigm of 
paradigms: it defined the legitimate models of proof and theorising, it imposed the choice of 
techniques and the dominance of abstract reasoning and deduction of the general laws. This 
approach ended in general failure, namely the analysis it provided for crises and change, 
irregularities and interdependency. Consequently, the lack of a deterministic, complete and 
definitive knowledge has been felt by many to be a loss, in the context of the shipwreck of 
positivism. This paper has argued precisely the reverse: such an evolution of economic science, now 
in more turbulent waters, simply brings it back to the investigation of reality. Nothing is lost and 
everything is transformed, since that is the condition of the world: stable and mutant, unstable and 
structural, an indeterministic world of which the scientist is a part. Ignorance is certainty about 
certainty: the wisdom which knows that it only knows something is wiser than that which claims to 
be able to know everything. 
 
A return to the Cambridge tradition is certainly part of this process of redefinition of economics. 
And, since finding patterns of structure and evolution is the very purpose of science, economics may 
be at the brink of a new era, with the combined contributions of experimental and computational 
economics, permitting the simulation of new generations of models aimed at the description of real 
markets and social choice. Yet, for long, the understanding of human agency escaped this intention. 
Changing the map of social sciences, experimental and computational economics may now allow 
for a new inductive, empirically oriented and theoretically renewed perspective. But only the future 
will answer this query: is it possible to rebuild economics as a sensitively realistic social science? 
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